[Senator Teller was the leader of the opposition on the 19th of February, when Senator Sherman, supported by Hoar, Lodge, Fry, Turpie and others, was trying hard, in response to public desire, to bring the treaty to a vote. Taking advantage of the rules, he stood as an obstructionist, and in response to all questions said that no vote could be had until after the 4th of March. Though "in favor of arbitration of all cases that can be arbitrated," whatever that may mean, he is opposed to this treaty, and after the 4th of March will be against it, and will try to talk it to death, unless it shall be so amended as to take all the meaning out of it. As it is, he is utterly unable to grasp "what it means." What Ex-Senator Edmunds, Judge Brewer, Senator Hoar, Senator Turpie and other learned statesmen and jurists have found simple and easy to comprehend, is too profound for him. He seems to fear that if the treaty should be passed in its present shape, no future president and senate would be able to arrange the preliminaries of submission of any case of difficulty that might arise. He must have them told beforehand how to do it, lest when the time of action comes they should smother to death in the fumes of their own ignorance. Every future president must have down in black and white exactly what is to "affect our foreign and domestic policy" for all time! "The treaty is not capable of self-execution!" But who has imagined that it would be? Will Senator Teller tell us why any future congress could not fix the term of the arbitrators and their compensation for each occasion, as well as it could be done this year? The simple truth behind all the senator's labored generalities is that he does not want an arbitration treaty with Great Britain, unless it be made certain beforehand that we shall drive her to the wall every time. That is why the treaty went over! But such a treaty no true American wants or will ever consent to have.—ED.]

THE ARBITRATION TREATY.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN FISKE.

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The first impression which one gets from reading the treaty is that it is strictly defined and limited in its application. Yet when duly considered, it seems to cover all chances of controversy that are likely to arise between the United States and Great Britain. Under such a treaty as this, nearly all the questions at issue between the two countries since 1783 might have been satisfactorily adjusted: the payment of private debts to British creditors, the relinquishment of the frontier posts by British garrisons, the northeastern boundary, the partition of the Oregon territory, the questions concerning the Newfoundland fisheries, the navigation of the Great Lakes, the catching of seals in Behring Sea, the difference of opinion over the San Juan boundary, etc. Possibly some of the old questions growing out of the African slave-trade might have been brought within its purview, but that is now of small consequence, since no issues of that sort are likely ever to rise again. Differences attending the future construction of a Nicaragua canal, regarded as an easement or a servitude possibly affecting vested rights, might, under a liberal interpretation, be dealt with; and one may suppose that the Venezuela question is meant to be covered, since it relates to territorial claims in which, though they may not obviously concern the United States either immediately or remotely, our government has with unexpected emphasis declared itself interested.

On the other hand, one does not seem to find in the treaty any provision which would have covered two or three of the most serious questions that have ever been in dispute between the United States and Great Britain. One of these questions, concerning the right of search and the impressment of seamen, was conspicuous among the causes of the ill-considered and deplorable War of 1812. But it may be presumed, with strong probability, that no difficulty of that kind can again arise between these two powers. The affair of the Trent in 1861 seems also to be a kind of case not provided for. But that affair, most creditably settled at a moment of fierce irritation and under aggravating circumstances, was settled in such wise as to establish a great principle which will make it extremely difficult for such a case to occur again. . .

There is no doubt that the good work is undertaken in entire good faith by both nations; both earnestly wish to make international arbitration successful, and there is little fear that the importance of fair dealing will be overlooked or undervalued. If the present proceedings result in the establishment of a tribunal whose integrity and impartiality shall win the permanent confidence of British and Americans alike, it will be an immense achievement, fraught with incalculable benefit to mankind. . . .

For observe that the interest of the present treaty lies not so much in the fact that it provides for arbitration as in the fact that it aims at making arbitration the regular and permanent method of settling international disputes. In due proportion to the gravity of the problem is the modest caution with which it is approached. The treaty merely asks to be tried on its merits, and only for five years at that. Only for such a brief period is the most vociferous Jingo in the United States Senate or elsewhere asked to put a curb upon his sanguinary propensities, and see what will happen. . . .

The working of the tribunals created by the present treaty will be carefully watched by other nations than the two parties directly concerned, and should it achieve any notable success it will furnish a precedent likely to be imitated. The removal of any source of irritation at all comparable to the Alabama Claims would be, of course, a success of the first magnitude; great good, with far-reaching consequences, might be wrought by a much smaller one. Probably few readers are aware of the extent to which the arbitration at Geneva in 1872 has already served as a precedent for the peaceful solution of international difficulties. Already the moral effect of that event has been such as to suggest that it may hereafter be commemorated as the illustrious herald of a new era. . . .

It may be urged that arbitration cannot often succeed in dealing with difficulties so formidable as those connected with the Alabama Claims. The questions hitherto settled by arbitration have for the most part been of minor importance, in which "national honor" has not

been at stake, and the bestial impulse to tear and bruise, which so many light-headed persons mistake for patriotism, has not been aroused. . . .

People who prefer civilized and gentlemanlike methods of settling disputes to the savage and ruffianlike business of burning and slaughtering are sometimes stigmatized by silly writers as "sentimentalists." In the deliberate public opinion which has come to be so strong a force in preventing war between the United States and Great Britain, sentiment has as yet probably no great place; but it is hoped and believed that it will by and by have much more. . . .

As feelings of dislike between the peoples of two countries are always unintelligent and churlish, so feelings of friendship are sure to be broadening and refining. The abiding sentiment of Scotchmen toward England was for many centuries immeasurably more rancorous than any Yankee schoolboy ever gave vent to on the Fourth of July. There is no reason why the advent of the twenty-first century should not find the friendship between the United States and Great Britain quite as strong as that between Scotland and England to-day. Toward so desirable a consummation a permanent policy of arbitration must surely tend.

The fact that deliberate public opinion in both countries can be counted upon as strongly adverse to war is the principal fact which makes such a permanent policy feasible. It is our only sufficient guarantee that the awards of the international tribunal will be respected. These considerations need to be borne in mind if we try to speculate upon the probable influence upon other nations of a successful system of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain. Upon the continent of Europe a considerable interest seems already to have been felt in the treaty, and, as I observed above, its working is sure to be carefully watched; for the states of Europe are suffering acutely from the apparent necessity of keeping perpetually prepared for war, and any expedient that holds out the slightest chance of relief from such a burden cannot fail to attract earnest attention. . . .

It is the steadily increasing complication of industrial life, and the heightened standard of living that has come therewith, that are making men, year by year, more unwilling to endure the burdens entailed by war. In the Middle Ages, human life was made hideous by famine, pestilence, perennial warfare, and such bloody superstitions as the belief in witchcraft; but men contrived to endure it, because they had no experience of anything better, and could not even form a conception of relief save such as the Church afforded. Deluges of war, fraught with horrors which stagger our powers of conception, swept at brief intervals over every part of the continent of Europe, and the intervals were mostly filled with petty waspish raids that brought robbery and murder home to everybody's door; while honest industry, penned up within walled towns, was glad of such precarious immunity as stout battlements eked out by blackmail could be made to afford. Fighting was incessant and ubiquitous. The change wrought in six centuries has been amazing, and it has been chiefly due to industrial development. Private warfare has been extinguished, famine and pestilence seldom occur in civilized countries, mental habits nutured by science have banished the witches, the land is covered with cheerful homesteads, and the achievement of success in life through devotion to industrial pursuits has become general. Wars have greatly diminished in frequency, in length, and in the amount of misery needlessly inflicted. We have thus learned how pleasant life can become under peaceful conditions, and we are determined as far as possible to prolong such conditions. We have no notion of submitting to misery like that of the Middle Ages; on the contrary, we have got rid of so much of it that we mean to go on and get rid of the whole. Such is the general feeling among civilized men. It may safely be said not only that no nation in Christendom wishes to go to war, but also the nations are few which would not make a considerable sacrifice of interests and feelings rather than incur its calamities. For reasons such as these the states of Continental Europe are showing an increasing disposition to submit questions to arbitration, and in view of this situation the fullest measure of success for our Arbitration Treaty is to be desired, for the sake of its moral effect. . . .

The modern development of industry has given rise to problems that press for solution, and no satisfactory solution can be reached in the midst of this monstrous armed peace. Competition has reached a point where no nation can afford to divert a considerable percentage of its population from industrial pursuits. Each nation, in order to maintain its rank in the world, is called upon to devote its utmost energies to agriculture, manufactures and commerce. Moreover, the economic disturbances due to the withdrawal of so many men from the work of production are closely connected with the discontent which finds vent in the wild schemes of socialists, communists, and anarchists. There is no other way of beginning the work of social redemption but by general disarmament; and this opinion has for some years been gaining strength in Europe. It is commonly felt that in one way or another the state of armed peace will have to be abandoned. The next few years will probably strengthen this feeling. . . .

While every successful resort to arbitration is to be welcomed as a step toward facilitating disarmament, it seems probable that institutions of somewhat broader scope than courts of arbitration will be required for the settlement of many complex international questions. In the European congresses which have assembled from time to time to deal with peculiar exigencies, we have the precedent for such more regular and permanent institutions. An example of what is meant was furnished by the Congress of Paris in 1856, when it dealt summarily with the whole group of vexed questions relating to the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents upon the ocean, and put an end to the chaos of two centuries by establishing an international code relating to piracy, blockades, and seizures in times of naval war. This code has been respected by maritime powers and enforced by the world's public opinion, and its establishment was a memorable incident in the advance of civilization. Now, such work as the Congress of Paris did can be done in future by other congresses, but it is work of broader scope than has hitherto been undertaken by courts of arbitration. I am inclined to think that both these institutions—the international congress and the tribunal of arbitration—are destined to survive, with very considerable increase in power and dignity, in the political society of the future, long after disarmament has become an accomplished fact. . . .

The vast armaments now maintained on the continent

of Europe cannot possibly endure. Economic necessities will put an end to them before many years. But disarmament, apparently, can only proceed *pari passu* with the establishment of peaceful methods of settling international questions. The machinery for this will probably be found in the further development of two institutions that have already come into existence, the International Congress and the Court of Arbitration. The existence of these institutions, which is now occasional, will tend to become permanent. . . .

It may be surmised as not improbable that in course of time the occasions for summoning European congresses will recur with increasing frequency until the functions which they are called upon to discharge will convert them into a permanent institution. Such a development, combined with the increased employment of arbitration, must ultimately tend toward the creation of a Federal Union in Europe. . . .

When Washington wrote his Farewell Address, the danger of our getting dragged into the mighty struggle then raging in Europe was a real and serious danger, against which we needed to be solemnly warned. Since then times have changed, and they are changing still. From a nation scarcely stronger than Portugal, we have become equal to the strongest. Railways, telegraphs and international industries are making every part of the world the neighbor of every other part. To preserve a policy of isolation will not always be possible, nor will it be desirable. Situations will arise (if they have not already arisen) in which such moral weight as the United States can exert will be called for. The pacification of Europe, therefore, is not an affair that is foreign to our interests. In that, as in every other aspect of the Christian policy of "peace on earth and good will to men," we are most deeply concerned; and every incident, like the present Arbitration Treaty, that promises to advance us even by one step toward the sublime result, it is our solemn duty to welcome and encourage by all the means within our power.—*The Atlantic Monthly.*

THE ACME OF CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION UP TO THIS HOUR.

BY F. W.

Truth climbs in spirals, and men's minds have stretched upward like Jack's bean stalk, these last years, toward the heavenly concept of peace. Whoever helps to impart that inspiration to one more human heart has by no means lived in vain.

There are certain senators at Washington whose children will not be given to telling that their illustrious sires delayed the ratification of the world's first great arbitration treaty. To have set the seal of their votes to that document without delay would have had a moral effect upon all other nations, too great to be computed. The antecedent supposition of every patriot would have been that the ratification would not have been at all delayed, for the treaty is no new thing to the American people, we have been thinking of it long. Our President advocated its principles years ago in his annual message, and the response of the press in England and America was practically unanimous.

In the Queen's speech at the opening of parliament, she not only expressed her satisfaction that the treaty had been ratified by the two governments, but hoped that it might furnish such a solution as would prove satisfactory to other nations. King Oscar, at the opening of the Congress in Stockholm, expressed the pride he felt in being authorized to choose an umpire in case the three American and three English judges, who are to be appointed to represent the respective governments, were not able to agree. And now our wise "jingo" senators profess to think that if in any case King Oscar were appealed to, the decision would be in favor of England rather than America. We will venture to say that the senators who thus express themselves, know very little about King Oscar. He is a man of such high character, and personally so disconnected from all entangling alliances with England, that a more desirable selection could not have been made. He has the warmest regard for the United States; tens of thousands of his countrymen having made their homes here, and, standing in the presence of the civilized world with the desire to leave to its historic annals a spotless reputation for fair dealing, it would be likely that if the pendulum of his decision swung to either side, it would be in favor of America. But in order to provide against any possible miscarriage of justice the treaty enables either party to select another umpire, either for all cases that may arise under the treaty, or in any particular case.

Ex-United States Senator Edmunds has reminded us that "in the great arbitration treaty of 1871, we agreed that three members of the Geneva tribunal should be named by three sovereigns—two of them European; and that if any or all these sovereigns should fail to name these members, the King of Sweden should name them all. In the same treaty, we did not hesitate to submit the very important question of our boundary on the Pacific coast to the Emperor of Germany."

The treaty stipulates that any award to be final must be made by a vote of not less than five to one in a court consisting of three American and three English jurists. It has been well said by Secretary Olney that it could not be that two Americans would join the English side of the court on any question unless they were warranted in so doing by the facts and presentations of the case before the court. A five to one award guarantees absolute fairness and disarms all the criticisms that have been directed against the treaty. And yet the latest news is that no action has been taken, and that it seems probable none will be for some weeks to come!

Is it possible that this delay has a political animus? We know that it is the rising rather than the setting sun before which men prostrate themselves in worship, and it is by no means inconceivable that this delay on the part of the Senate is complicated with a desire to bring in the new treaty under the new administration. If the American people receive any such impression, so much the worse for those who give it. Perhaps no paper in the country has been less of a partisan so far as Mr. Cleveland is concerned than ours, and this is for the reason that, while we see much in him to admire, we know that he is an uncompromising opponent of prohibition and the woman's ballot. But it is under his administration and largely through his influence that the arbitration treaty has been carried to a successful issue, and he has a right to the good-will of his countrymen, irrespective of party, because of this great patriotic action which marks the acme of Christian civilization up to this hour.—*The Union Signal.*